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Mistake in Assumptions
Abstract

Mistake raises several important and difficult questions for contract law. The question addressed here is, when
is it an excuse from contractual obligation that a contract has been made under the influence of a mistake of
fact? Posed in this form, the question invites attention to aspects of contract law not usually considered in
relation to each other, particularly misrepresentation, frustration, and more generally, unjust enrichment, all
areas in which Professor McCamus has written extensively. This article brings these areas together with the
object of throwing useful light on each of them, both from the point of view of understanding the legal past,
and from the point of view of proposing appropriate rules for the future.
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Mistake in Assumptions

STEPHEN WADDAMS*
0LVWDNH UDLVHV VHYHUDO LPSRUWDQW DQG GLIéFXOW TXHVWLRQV IRU FRQWUDFW ODZ 7KH TXHVWLRQ
DGGUHVVHG KHUH LV ZKHQ LV LW DQ H[FXVH IURP FRQWUDFWXDO REOLJDWLRQ WKDW D FRQWUDFW KDV
EHHQPDGHXQGHUWKHLQêXHQFHRIDPLVWDNHRIIDFW"3RVHGLQWKLVIRUPWKHTXHVWLRQLQYLWHV
DWWHQWLRQWRDVSHFWVRIFRQWUDFWODZQRWXVXDOO\FRQVLGHUHGLQUHODWLRQWRHDFKRWKHUSDUWLFXODUO\ PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ IUXVWUDWLRQ DQG PRUH JHQHUDOO\ XQMXVW HQULFKPHQW DOO DUHDV LQ
ZKLFK3URIHVVRU0F&DPXVKDVZULWWHQH[WHQVLYHO\7KLVDUWLFOHEULQJVWKHVHDUHDVWRJHWKHU
ZLWK WKH REMHFW RI WKURZLQJ XVHIXO OLJKW RQ HDFK RI WKHP ERWK IURP WKH SRLQW RI YLHZ RI
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHOHJDOSDVWDQGIURPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRISURSRVLQJDSSURSULDWHUXOHVIRU
WKHIXWXUH
/HV HUUHXUV VRXO«YHQW TXDQWLW¬ GH TXHVWLRQV FUXFLDOHV HW DUGXHV HQ PDWL«UH GH GURLW
FRQWUDFWXHO /D TXHVWLRQ DERUG¬H LFL HVW GH VDYRLU GDQV TXHOOHV FLUFRQVWDQFHV XQ FRQWUDW
HQWDFK¬GÙXQHHUUHXUGHIDLWG¬JDJHVHVSDUWLHVGHOÙREOLJDWLRQFRQWUDFWXHOOH"3RV¬HDLQVL
ODTXHVWLRQPHWHQOXPL«UHGHVDVSHFWVGXGURLWFRQWUDFWXHOTXLQHVRQWJ¬Q¬UDOHPHQWSDV
H[DPLQ¬VOÙXQSDUUDSSRUW£OÙDXWUHHQSDUWLFXOLHUOHVIDXVVHVG¬FODUDWLRQVOÙLQH[¬FXWDELOLW¬
HW GH IDªRQ SOXV J¬Q¬UDOH OÙHQULFKLVVHPHQW LQMXVWLé¬ WRXV GHV GRPDLQHV VXU OHVTXHOV OH
SURIHVVHXU0F&DPXVDDERQGDPPHQW¬FULW&HWDUWLFOHUDVVHPEOHFHVDVSHFWVGDQVOHEXW
GÙ¬FODLUHU FKDFXQ GÙHX[ WDQW SRXU OD FRPSU¬KHQVLRQ GX V\VW«PH MXULGLTXH SDVV¬ TXH OD
SURSRVLWLRQGHU«JOHVDSSURSUL¬HVSRXUOÙDYHQLU

*

Stephen Waddams, Goodman/Schipper Professor of Law, University of Toronto. An
earlier version of this article was originally presented at the Symposium in Honour of John
McCamus: Scholarship, Teaching and Leadership (7 February 2013), hosted at Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, Toronto.
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THIS ARTICLE ADDRESSES ONE OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

of contract law: When is it an excuse that a contract has been made under
the influence of a mistake of fact? Posing the question in this form invites
attention to aspects of contract law not always considered in relation to each
other, particularly misrepresentation, frustration, and, more generally, unjust
enrichment. Considering these areas together will, it is suggested, throw useful
light on each of them, both from the point of view of understanding the past,
and from the point of view of proposing just and workable rules for the future.
George Palmer wrote, over fifty years ago, that finding a workable scheme of
classification was “one of the most intractable problems in the law of mistake.”1
He added that,
[i]n many parts of the law there is a generally accepted framework of classification, but this is not true of mistake. Distinctions that some writers find important
are ignored by others or else dismissed as unimportant. In the decisions there is
a lack of system that goes far beyond what one expects to find in our generally
unsystematic case-law.2

These words remain largely true in respect of Anglo-Canadian law. Mistake is
intertwined with concepts of contract formation, the objective principle of contract
interpretation, the law relating to written contractual documents (including the
effect of signature and equivalent manifestations of assent), the parol evidence
rule, transfer of title to goods, non est factum, rectification, misrepresentation,
frustration, and unjust enrichment. To a large extent, the law on each of these
topics has developed independently, so that their interrelationship remains largely
unexamined. The result does little credit to common law methods.
1.
2.

George Palmer, Mistake and Unjust Enrichment (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1962) at 4-5.
Ibid at 5.
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Palmer, following the words just quoted, continued by proposing a
“fundamental” distinction between “mistake in the expression of a transaction”
(in which he included “misunderstanding” and “mistake in integration”) and “a
mistake that relates only to the reasons for entering into the transaction,” which
he called “mistake in assumptions.”3 He wrote:
The distinction parallels that between the statement “I did not intend to say this”
and “I did intend to say this but it was because I mistakenly believed the facts were
thus and so.” Although situations shade into one another, the distinction seems inescapable if we are to separate mistake in integration from mistake in assumptions.
It is also essential to an analysis of the consequences of misunderstanding.4

This is the same distinction that was recognized in Smith v Hughes,5 the case
of the oats mistakenly thought to be old, where a crucial distinction was drawn
between the buyer’s belief (after examining the sample and making his own
judgment) that the oats were in fact old, and the buyer’s belief that the seller had
positively contracted that they were old. Justice Blackburn said, “The difference
is the same as that between buying a horse believed to be sound, and buying one
believed to be warranted sound... .”6
Palmer, when he came to deal with mistake in assumptions, suggested that
the crucial considerations were avoidance of unjust enrichment and allocation
of risk.7 Palmer’s thinking has directly influenced the Second Restatement of
Contracts8 but has not yet been fully adopted in English or Canadian law.
Professor John McCamus has largely accepted Palmer’s framework of analysis,
and argues persuasively and effectively in favour of its adoption by Canadian
courts. McCamus’s treatment of the law relating to mistake in assumptions is, in
my opinion, very valuable: He combines an accurate account of the actual law,
past and present, with cogent critical analysis, in readable and interesting form,
and does all this in a way that constitutes a model for academic analysis, while
at the same time successfully addressing—and actually influencing—the courts.9
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ibid at 5-6.
Ibid at 6.
(1871) LR 6 QB 597, [1861-73] All ER Rep 632.
Ibid at 638.
Palmer, supra note 1 at 38, 53-57.
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts, § 151-54 (1981).
Miller Paving Ltd v B Gottardo Construction Ltd, 2007 ONCA 422 at paras 20, 24, 26,
86 OR (3d) 161 [Miller Paving], citing John D McCamus, “Mistaken Assumptions in
Equity: Sound Doctrine or Chimera?” (2004) 40:1 Can Bus LJ 46 [McCamus, “Mistaken
Assumptions”]. See also Stone’s Jewellery Ltd v Arora, 2009 ABQB 656, 314 DLR (4th) 166 at
para 30 [Stone’s Jewellery].
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I. EQUITY
Unfortunately, for a writer seeking an easy and accessible way in which to present
the issues surrounding mistake in assumptions, an examination of the relation
between common law and equity cannot be avoided. Before the Judicature Acts,10
the courts of equity had an undoubted power to rescind an agreement for mistake.
In Bingham v Bingham,11 an eighteenth-century case expressly approved by the
House of Lords in 1867,12 there was a mistake as to the title to land. The court
said, “though no fraud appeared, and the defendant apprehended he had a right,
yet there was a plain mistake, such as the court was warranted to relieve against,
and not to suffer the defendant to run away with the money in consideration
of the sale of an estate, to which he had no right.”13 The phrase “run away with
the money” plainly anticipates an unjust enrichment perspective. The equitable
power to give relief was recognized by Joseph Story,14 Stephen Martin Leake,15
and J.P. Benjamin,16 and was affirmed by the House of Lords in Cooper v Phibbs
where Lord Westbury said,
at the time of the agreement ... the parties dealt with one another under a mutual
mistake as to their respective rights. ... In such a state of things there can be no doubt
of the rule of a Court of equity with regard to the dealing with that agreement. ... if
parties contract under a mutual mistake and misapprehension as to their relative and
respective rights, the result is, that that agreement is liable to be set aside as having
proceeded upon a common mistake.17

The relevance of “mutual” or “common” mistake will be discussed below in
Part III, below.
Though the existence of the equitable power to rescind a contract was not
doubted, its limits were ill-defined. The power was, like all equitable remedies,
discretionary, and the discretion would not be exercised in the absence of what
10. Judicature Acts, 1873 (UK), 36 & 37 Vict c 66, s 25(11).
11. (1748) 1 Ves Sen 126 [Bingham]. See also Palmer, supra note 1 at 100, n 14 (listing several
other eighteenth- and nineteenth-century equity cases).
12. Cooper v Phibbs, [1867] UKHL 1, LR 2 HL 149 [Cooper].
13. Bingham, supra note 11 at 81 [citations omitted].
14. Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, vol 1 (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1836) at 155. Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 13th ed, vol 1
by Melville M Bigelow (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown & Company, 1886) at 149-50.
15. Stephen Martin Leake, The Elements of the Law of Contracts (London, UK: Stevens, 1867) at
178.
16. JP Benjamin, A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property: with references to the American
decisions and to the French code and civil law (London, UK: H Sweet, 1868) at 303.
17. Cooper, supra note 12 at para 23.
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seemed to the court to be sufficient reason. After the Judicature Acts, it might
have been expected that the new court, uniting as it did the powers of the courts
of law and equity (with equity to prevail in case of conflict18), would exercise the
power of the former court of equity to rescind contracts for mistake. However,
despite the Judicature Acts, there was a reluctance by English writers and judges to
recognize the full breadth of the equitable power to rescind for mistake. Palmer
put it this way: “[I]n modern times English judges have sometimes remembered
earlier English equity, but often it seems to be either forgotten or consciously
discarded.”19 The main reason for this reluctance was probably that the limits of
the equitable power had not been clearly defined.20 Without the ability to state
clear limits, recognition of the power appeared to jeopardize the stability and
certainty of contracts and was out of keeping with the desire prevailing in the
late nineteenth century to achieve a high degree of predictability and certainty in
legal rules, which was combined with a deep suspicion of discretion in judicial
decision-making.
An important and closely related reason for the infrequent use of equitable
power was that it appeared unnecessary, and therefore undesirable, to separate the
concept of relief for mistake from that of contract formation: It appeared to be an
attractive simplification to apply a single principle (consent) to both, and thereby
to eliminate altogether the need for discussion of the old equitable jurisdiction.21
But looking at the question in terms of contract formation was wholly alien to
the methods of thought of the old equity cases. Equity intervened in order to
prevent an unconscionable result, not because the contract was void. On the
contrary, the contract was assumed to be valid at law, and this was precisely why
the intervention of equity was both justified and required. Here, as elsewhere, the
effect of merging the equitable and legal jurisdictions was, ironically, to suppress
the former equitable powers to grant relief.22

18. Judicature Acts, supra note 10.
19. Palmer, supra note 1 at 14.
20. Catharine MacMillan, Mistakes in Contract Law (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2010) at
48-49.
21. See the discussion of the works of Frederick Pollock in Part II, below.
22. Stephen Waddams, “Equity in English Contract Law: the Impact of the Judicature Acts
(1873-75)” (2012) 33:2 J Legal Hist 185 [Waddams, “Equity in English Contract Law”].
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II. CONSENT
The apparent attraction of a single simple principle (consent) to resolve the
problem of mistake ran into two fundamental and related difficulties. The first
was that the adoption of consent as the sole determining test had the effect of
excluding other relevant dimensions of the question. These other dimensions
might be summarized as asking whether the risk of the mistake could fairly be
said to have been allocated by the contract to the mistaken party. The same point
might be stated in terms of whether the promisee had a reasonable expectation
of receiving the benefit of the transaction and whether any enrichment caused by
enforcement of the transaction should be considered unjust.
The second and related difficulty was that a test based solely on consent was
potentially far too wide. Almost every disadvantageous contract involves a mistake
of some sort, and in almost every such case it is possible for the disadvantaged
party to show that in the absence of the mistake the contract would not have
been made. To set aside contracts for this reason alone would undermine the
security of transactions. Before the Judicature Acts, this danger was avoided by the
self-restraint of equity in exercising the power to rescind.
It seems, at first sight, to be an advance in legal thinking to formulate a
single simple principle that will determine all cases without the need to resort
to discretion. But to say that the only test is whether the purported contract is
void for lack of consent conceals the need for the court to exercise judgment
in determining the question of whether the risk can fairly be said to have been
allocated by the contract to the mistaken party. This process undoubtedly involves
an element of uncertainty; but uncertainty cannot satisfactorily be eliminated,
since addressing the question of risk allocation is crucial to the attainment of
results that are fair to the individual parties and that maintain the stability of
transactions, while avoiding very large fortuitous enrichments. Palmer said that,
“There is no simple formula for testing relievable mistake. … at the critical point
of decision there is no substitute for what Holmes once called ‘judgment and
tact …,’”23 but these propositions were not agreeable to the search for precision
that dominated English law during the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth
centuries. One can appreciate the seductive temptation, from the point of view of
precision and predictability, of reducing every mistake question to the question
of consent, but the attempt to make consent the sole relevant principle has had
the effect of concealing or eliminating other equally important principles.

23. Palmer, supra note 1 at 53.
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The loss of the equitable perspective had other consequences. The concept of
a contract that is not necessarily void, but that may be set aside by the judgment
of the court for sufficient reason (i.e., that is voidable), admits of the possibility of
enforcement by the mistaken party if that party so chooses. It also admits of the
possibility of partial relief or relief on terms that the court can fashion in order to
meet the circumstances of the particular case. And it admits of the possibility of
denying or restricting relief in order to protect third parties who may have relied
on the validity of the contract. These important objects were familiar features
of equity, but they tend to be lost if the sole and decisive question is formulated
in terms of whether the contract is void for lack of consent. One of the hidden
effects of the adoption of consent as the sole test of mistake in English law has
been the loss of important elements of flexibility that had existed in English
law as it was (taking the two systems together) before the Judicature Acts. This
loss of flexibility was not intended or authorized by the Judicature Acts, and,
partly because the former equitable flexibility has not generally been recognized
by modern English courts or English law, no serious attempt to justify its removal
has ever been advanced.
Frederick Pollock, as the influential author of the first book to examine the
effects on contract law of the unification of the courts,24 must take much of
the responsibility for the weakening of the old equitable jurisdiction. Catharine
MacMillan’s severe, but justified, observation is that “the equitable treatment of
mistake was sometimes overlooked, sometimes misunderstood and sometimes
marginalised in Pollock’s treatment of it.”25 The first edition of Pollock’s Principles
of Contract at Law and in Equity, published in 1876, included a chapter on
mistake, which, though lengthy,26 was rather discursive, inconclusive, and, at
times, self-contradictory. He wrote that “[m]istake does not of itself affect the
validity of contracts at all,”27 adding in a footnote that “as Fear is to Coercion so
is Mistake to Fraud,”28 implying that mistake is irrelevant without fraud. He then
added, “But mistake may be such as to prevent any real agreement from being

24. Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract at Law and in Equity: being a Treatise on the General
Principles concerning the Validity of Agreements, with a special view to the Comparison of Law
and Equity, and with reference to the Indian Contract Act, and occasionally to Roman, American,
and Continental Law (London, UK: Stevens and Sons, 1876) [Pollock, Principles of Contract
at Law and in Equity].
25. MacMillan, supra note 20 at 153.
26. The chapter on mistake occupies 88 pages in a book of 577 pages.
27. Pollock, supra note 24 at 357 [emphasis in original].
28. Ibid at 357, n a. [emphasis in original].
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formed; in which case the agreement is void both at law and in equity ... .”29 These
words indicate an attempt to assimilate law and equity under the single principle
of contract formation, and this theme was reflected in the principal subheading
of the chapter pertaining to mistake entitled “As excluding true consent.”30
One of the dangers of adopting a legal test that is too wide is that, when, as
inevitably happens, it is rejected, there is a swing to the opposite extreme of an
unduly narrow test. This is illustrated by Pollock’s treatment of consent. In his
first edition Pollock cited, with full approval, the following proposition from the
Indian Contract Act: “Where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake
as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void.”31 This
proposition was too wide to be an accurate description of English law in 1876, or
to be acceptable as a test for the future, and Pollock must soon have realized this,
for he distanced himself from the proposition by degrees. In the third edition,
the concept of consent was introduced with the words, “The Indian Contract Act
gives the rule in rather wide language … .”32 And in the fifth edition, published
in 1889, it was reduced to a footnote.33
A. BELL V LEVER BROS LTD

In English law, the adoption of consent as the only relevant criterion led to
the assertion, in Bell v Lever Bros Ltd, of what came to be perceived as a very
narrow view of relief for mistake.34 In that case, large sums of money were
paid to terminate two employment contracts that could have been terminated
without any compensation had the employer known of earlier misconduct by the
employees. Restitution of the money was sought by the employer and allowed by
the two lower courts, but disallowed by a bare majority of the House of Lords.
It has been pointed out by McCamus, as by others, that the very narrow view of
availability of relief for which the case has usually been thought to stand is based
largely on the opinion of Lord Atkin alone, and that Lord Atkin’s opinion itself
29. Ibid at 357.
30. Ibid at 367.
31. Ibid at 397. Pollock states: “We cannot do better than begin with the rule and illustrations as
given in the Indian Contract Act… .” (ibid).
32. Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract: being a Treatise on the General Principles concerning
the validity of agreements in the Law of England, 3d ed (London, UK: Stevens and Sons, 1881)
at 455 [emphasis added].
33. Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract: a Treatise on the General Principles concerning the
validity of agreements in the Law of England, 5th ed (London, UK: Stevens and Sons, 1889) at
469, n k.
34. Bell v Lever Bros Ltd, [1932] AC 161 (HL), [1931] UKHL 2 [Bell].
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contains significant ambiguities.35 McCamus goes on to argue that the result of
refusing relief could well be supported on the ground that an employer who
agrees to a severance payment without enquiry may be said to take the risk of
prior misconduct.36
Another way of supporting the result (perhaps itself only a variation of
the risk-analysis approach) might be to observe that the payments made were
far too large to be explained as a compromise of possible claims for wrongful
dismissal. The whole case for relief depends on the suggestion that the company
had paid £50,000 for something (i.e., dismissal of the employees) that it could
have had for nothing.37 But the context suggests that the payments were approved
by the directors partly as gifts. The letters offering the payments spoke of the
deep appreciation of the board for the employees’ work for the company.38 Their
salaries were £8,000 and £6,000, respectively, and their contracts had two years
left to run at the date of termination. A fair compromise of claims for wrongful
dismissal might, one would suppose, have been in the range of £20,000 to
£25,000 at the most, allowing for mitigation; but the company paid more than
twice as much. Since it was not possible to separate the gift element from the
compromise element and since the motive for making the gifts was recognition of
valuable services that the company had actually received (as to which there was no
fundamental mistake), it can be argued in support of McCamus’s analysis that the
employer assumed the risk of paying more than the employees’ strict entitlement.
Nevertheless, as mentioned, Bell v Lever Bros Ltd was interpreted by the
English courts and by commentators as restricting relief for mistake to very
narrow grounds. In Solle v Butcher, a case decided by the Court of Appeal in
1950,39 Lord Denning accepted that Bell v Lever Bros Ltd laid down a very narrow
test at common law, but then sought to avoid the result by reasserting the powers
of the old Court of Equity. As the discussion above indicates, Lord Denning
could claim considerable historical support for his view of equity, but the effect
of his decision was unfortunate because, partly on account of his reputation as
a bold (and, his critics would say, heretical) innovator, the decision in Solle v
Butcher was inevitably seen as barely concealed defiance of the House of Lords.
35. John McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2012) at 562-65
[McCamus, The Law of Contracts].
36. Ibid at 564.
37. Palmer, supra note 1 at 92.
38. Bell, supra note 34 at 7. The letters exchanged between the parties stated: “I should like to be
allowed to say how deeply the Board of Messrs. Lever Brothers appreciate the work that you
have done for the Niger Company during the period that you have been in control.”
39. Solle v Butcher, [1950] 1 KB 671, [1949] 2 All ER 1107 [Solle].
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Lord Denning himself did little to dispel this impression in saying that “if [Bell v
Lever Bros Ltd] had been considered on equitable grounds, the result might have
been different.”40 Of course, the House of Lords in 1932 was as fully a court of
equity as was the Court of Appeal in 1950, and it was perhaps a little tactless
to suggest that the House had overlooked that fact (which would itself be a
rather fundamental mistake). Solle v Butcher, therefore, though followed in some
English and Canadian cases,41 was often regarded with a degree of suspicion. In
Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd,42 Solle v Butcher
was rejected by the English Court of Appeal as inconsistent with the principles of
Bell v Lever Bros Ltd. Lord Phillips stated:
We are only concerned with the question whether relief might be given for common
mistake in circumstances wider than those stipulated in Bell v Lever Brothers. But
that, surely, is a question as to where the common law should draw the line; not
whether, given the common law rule, it needs to be mitigated by the application of
some other doctrine. The common law has drawn the line in Bell v Lever Brothers.
The effect of Solle v Butcher is not to supplement or mitigate the common law; it is
to say that Bell v Lever Bros was wrongly decided.
Our conclusion is that it is impossible to reconcile Solle v Butcher with Bell v Lever
Brothers … . If coherence is to be restored to this area of our law, it can only be by
declaring that there is no jurisdiction to grant rescission of a contract on the ground
of common mistake where that contract is valid and enforceable on ordinary principles of contract law. 43

It is a curious irony that the equitable jurisdiction (which was supposed to
prevail after 1875) should have been suppressed by reliance on the very feature
(the validity of the contract at common law) that had given jurisdiction to the
courts of equity in the first place. Wherever equity intervened to set aside a
contract, the contract was valid at common law (otherwise equity could not have
intervened).44
McCamus has criticized Great Peace in an influential article45 and in his
treatises on contracts and on restitution. As he persuasively shows, the actual
result (denial of relief ) in Great Peace was readily justifiable in the circumstances
of that case on the ground of allocation of risk: the defendant, faced with a serious
40. Ibid at 694.
41. See Grist v Bailey, [1967] Ch 532, [1966] 2 All ER 875; Toronto-Dominion Bank v Fortin et
al (No 2) (1978), 88 DLR (3d) 232, 27 CBR (NS) 232.
42. [2002] 4 All ER 689, 3 WLR 1617 [Great Peace cited to All ER].
43. Ibid at paras156-57 [emphasis in original].
44. See the discussion in Part I, above.
45. McCamus, “Mistaken Assumptions,” supra note 9.
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emergency, agreed to pay a minimum charge in exchange for the guaranteed
availability of the plaintiff’s ship for saving life in case rescue should be needed.
There was no need for the court, in enforcing the contract, to seek to reverse Solle
v Butcher. Lord Phillips, who gave the leading judgment, actually conceded that
a wider ground of relief than recognized in Bell v Lever Bros Ltd was desirable and
necessary and suggested legislative reform.46 That the court should reject Solle v
Butcher, and then immediately call for legislative reform to reinstate it (for the
legislature, if it did amend the law, would be likely to give back to the courts
some sort of wide equitable power), is, as McCamus rightly says, “particularly
unrealistic in the Canadian context,” where uniform (or indeed any) legislative
reform on this issue is unlikely.47 Even in the context of English law it seems
regrettable, and there is a reasonable prospect that the United Kingdom Supreme
Court may, for this reason, eventually reject the reasoning in Great Peace. In his
discussion of Great Peace, Sir Guenter Treitel wrote “that the American rules on
this subject are much closer to those of English equity than to those of the English
common law, and do not seem to have caused widespread inconvenience.”48
In the following edition, these words were repeated together with the express
suggestion that the House of Lords (then the highest court) might overrule the
Court of Appeal on this question.49

46. Great Peace, supra note 42 at para 161.
47. McCamus, “Mistaken Assumptions,” supra note 9 at 85.
48. Sir Guenter Treitel, Treitel: The Law of Contract, 11th ed (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell,
2003) at 312.
49. Edwin Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract, 12th ed (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007)
at 8-030. See also Futter v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2013]
UKSC 26, Pens LR 195 [Futter]. In Futter, the UK Supreme Court asserted and applied a
broad equitable power to rescind a trust instrument executed under a serious mistake as to
its tax consequences. It declined to extend the reasoning applied in Great Peace but stated,
without further comment, that Great Peace had “effectively overruled” Solle (ibid at para
115). The broad approach of the Supreme Court, however, to rescission for unconscionability
and its attention to “the traditional rules of equity,” suggest that Great Peace might well be
reconsidered on an appropriate occasion. See Futter at paras 115, 128.
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III. MUTUAL MISTAKE
Although the phrase “mutual mistake” was used in Cooper v Phibbs and has been
repeated in many modern cases and treatises, the equitable perspective implies
that it cannot be a requirement of relief that the mistake should be shared.
Relief was given, as MacMillan has said, “for reasons related to conscience,
and not consent.”50 In some circumstances, it was unconscientious to insist on
enforcement of an agreement made by the other party under a mistake; this
perspective implies that the case for relief is based not on lack of mutual consent
but on the mistake of the party who suffers by it. On this point, Palmer wrote
that “[i]t takes a peculiar sense of justice”51 to regard the case of a party damaged
by mistake as weaker where the other party knows the truth. McCamus similarly
suggests that it would be ironic to insist on a requirement of common mistake.52
The equitable perspective of preventing an unjust result suggests, as McCamus
also argues, that the crucial question is not whether the mistake was shared, but
whether the party damaged by the mistake could fairly be said to have agreed to
take the risk of the mistake.

IV. LAW, EQUITY, AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Attention to the equitable treatment of mistake before the Judicature Acts is, as we
have seen, necessary for an understanding of the past and supports an argument
in favour of recognizing a flexible power in the modern court to grant relief. But
it is scarcely desirable and unlikely to be productive, in the twenty-first century,
to propound an argument that, a century and a half after the Judicature Acts, an
equitable doctrine of mistake continues to exist parallel to, but somehow still
separate from, the common law. Modern Canadian courts are more likely to be
influenced by a simple argument that the court today has full power to do justice
between the parties and that general considerations of justice require a power to
give relief from contracts entered into on the basis of fundamental mistake in
order to avoid fortuitous and unjust enrichment, where the contract does not
allocate the risk of the mistake to the party who suffers by it. It is certainly open
to the Supreme Court of Canada to adopt such a view, particularly as the court
has been quite creative in the general field of unjust enrichment. McCamus, as

50. MacMillan, supra note 20 at 38. See also ibid at 53, 68, 136.
51. Palmer, supra note 1 at 94.
52. McCamus, The Law of Contracts, supra note 35 at 584.
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the author of the leading Canadian book on restitution,53 is in a uniquely strong
position to advance such an argument, and, as we have seen, the argument has
been substantially accepted by at least two Canadian courts.54
The topic can be assigned neither exclusively to contract, nor exclusively to
restitution, as McCamus’s parallel discussion of it in each of his treatises plainly
shows. It is true that contract and restitution may be, and often are, separate
sources of obligation, and that the independence of the subjects has naturally (in
view of the earlier regrettable entanglement of unjust enrichment with contract)
been emphasized by modern writers, but it does not follow that the concepts
operate entirely independently of each other. It has sometimes been suggested
that unjust enrichment has no role to play in adjusting the rights of contracting
parties unless and until the contract has first been set aside, but this approach is
not quite satisfactory in the present context because the question itself of whether
or not the contract should be set aside involves questions of unjust enrichment
(using that phrase in its general sense).55 The questions of unjust enrichment and
allocation of risk are similarly interrelated, because where the risk has, expressly
or by fair implication, been allocated by the contract to the mistaken party, the
consequent enrichment of the other party will not be perceived as unjust.
If a principle were adopted, as suggested, recognizing the power of the court,
in proper cases, to give relief for mistake in assumptions, and recognizing the
importance of avoiding unjust enrichment in this context, two other aspects of
contract law that have generally been considered separately from mistake would
be brought into a new perspective. These are the topics of misrepresentation and
frustration, both of which may be regarded as aspects of mistake and involve
considerations of unjust enrichment.

V. MISREPRESENTATION
Whenever the making of a contract is induced by a false statement by one
of the parties, a mistake in assumptions occurs on the part of both parties if
the misrepresentation is innocent. An innocent misrepresentation does not
necessarily justify the imposition of any obligation on the representor. If the
53. Peter D Maddaugh & John D McCamus, The Law of Restitution, loose-leaf (consulted on: 8
February 2013), v 2 (Toronto, ON: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2013), c 17 at 17:200.
54. See Miller Paving, supra note 9; Stone’s Jewellery, supra note 9.
55. See Stephen Waddams, “Contract and Unjust Enrichment: Competing Categories or
Complementary Concepts?” in Charles Rickett & Ross Grantham, eds, Structure and
Justification in Private Law: Essays for Peter Birks (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2008) at
167.
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statement in question does not meet the test of contractual formation, there is no
ground for imposing contractual liability;56 and if the statement does not meet
the test of tortious liability, there is no ground for imposing liability in tort.57
These propositions may be accepted, so far as they go, but it does not follow from
them that an innocent misrepresentation is legally irrelevant. There is another
relevant principle, namely that a misrepresentation inducing a contract, even
though it does not justify the imposition of any obligation on the misrepresentor,
affords the party misled an excuse from contractual obligation and, if the contract
has been executed, restitution to reverse an unjust enrichment.
The concept of misrepresentation as an excuse, recognized by equity before
the Judicature Acts,58 was powerfully reinforced by Sir George Jessel M.R. six years
after the acts came into force in Redgrave v Hurd:
As regards the rescission of a contract, there was no doubt a difference between the
rules of Courts of Equity and the rules of Courts of Common Law—a difference
which of course has now disappeared by the operation of the Judicature Act, which
makes the rules of equity prevail. According to the decisions of the Courts of Equity it was not necessary, in order to set aside a contract obtained by material false
representation, to prove that the party who obtained it knew at the time when the
representation was made that it was false. It was put in two ways, either of which
was sufficient. One way of putting the case was, “A man is not to be allowed to get a
benefit from a statement which he now admits to be false. ...” The other way of putting it was this: “Even assuming that moral fraud must be shewn in order to set aside
a contract, you have it where a man, having obtained a beneficial contract by a statement which he now knows to be false, insists upon keeping that contract. To do so is
a moral delinquency: no man ought to take advantage of his own false statements.”59

The phrases “get a benefit,” “obtained a beneficial advantage,” and “take
advantage of ” show that the avoidance of unjust enrichment (though not at
that time by that name) played a prominent part in Jessel’s reasoning. Jessel
emphasized the contrast with the common law position and the power of the
court to set aside or rescind the contract, not just to refuse specific performance.

56. Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton, [1912] UKHL 2, [1913] AC 30 [Heilbut].
57. Derry v Peek, [1889] UKHL 1, 14 App Cas 337 [Derry]. See also Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd
v Heller & Partners Ltd, [1963] UKHL 4, [1964] AC 465. In Hedley, negligence, though
recognized as a ground of liability for misrepresentation, required proof of fault.
58. Edward Fry, A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts Including Those of Public
Companies (London, UK: Butterworths, 1858) at 193. Edward Fry, A Treatise on the Specific
Performance of Contracts Including Those of Public Companies, 2nd ed (London, UK: Stevens
& Sons, 1881) at 282.
59. (1881) 20 Ch D 1 at 12-13.
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The significance of Redgrave v Hurd was neglected by Pollock,60 but was
recognized by Sir William Reynell Anson61 and by the House of Lords in Derry
v Peek,62 where it was distinguished from the question of tortious liability of the
representor for deceit. Lord Herschell said that the action in deceit
differs essentially from one brought to obtain rescission of a contract... . The principles which govern the two actions differ widely. Where rescission is claimed it is
only necessary to prove that there was misrepresentation; then, however honestly it
may have been made, however free from blame the person who made it, the contract, having been obtained by misrepresentation, cannot stand.63

He went on to contrast the tortious action for deceit where proof of dishonesty
was required. However, in Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton64 the House of Lords
held that a statement inducing a contract did not amount to a warranty in the
absence of contractual intention, adding that “[i]t is … of the greatest importance
... that this House should maintain in its full integrity the principle that a person
is not liable in damages for an innocent misrepresentation, no matter in what
way or under what form the attack is made.”65 This assertion was taken to exclude
any monetary award for innocent misrepresentation. Consequently, until statute
gave some flexibility,66 English law found itself in the very anomalous position of
allowing rescission where rescission would formerly have been given by a court of
equity, but denying any remedy at all where rescission was impossible, unless the
claimant could establish that the statement was fraudulent (in the common law
sense of actual deceit) or that it was a contractual warranty (a concept that would
have opened the door to excessive damages in some cases).
Thus, the equitable power of rescission for innocent misrepresentation was
accepted but minimized by being restricted to such remedies as could have been
given before 1875 by the court of equity acting alone. Had the courts after 1875
given attention to the reasons underlying the equitable power of rescission as
explained in Redgrave v Hurd (i.e., avoidance of unjust enrichment), they would
have concluded that the new court had ample power, where actual rescission
was impossible, to give a monetary remedy that would represent the economic
60. See discussion in Waddams, “Equity in English Contract Law,” supra note 22 at 198.
61. Sir William Reynell Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract and of Agency in its
relation to Contract, 5th ed (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1888) at 151-52.
62. Derry, supra note 57.
63. Ibid at 359. To the same effect, see also the words of Lord Bramwell at 347.
64. Heilbut, supra note 56.
65. Ibid at para 51.
66. Misrepresentation Act, 1967 (UK), c 7. The Misrepresentation Act, however, introduced new
complexities and anomalies.
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equivalent of rescission—not common law damages for a contractual or tortious
wrong, but an award calculated to prevent the maker of a false statement from
profiting by it. The neglect of this intermediate remedy has had lasting and
deleterious effects on this branch of English contract law. The complexities
that have caused so much trouble to Anglo-Canadian law67 are neatly and
compendiously resolved in a recent European document, Principles, Definitions
and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference,
which provides that a party may avoid a contract for mistake if “the other party
… caused the mistake.”68 The comment explains that the concept underlying
this provision is that justice requires that a person, even if completely innocent,
should not be allowed to make a profit from his or her own false statement. A
monetary obligation may arise, not as damages for any kind of wrongdoing, but
in order to avoid or reverse an unjust enrichment.69

VI. FRUSTRATION
The other topic that appears in a new light in relation to mistake in assumptions
is frustration. English treatises have generally treated mistake and frustration
as completely separate topics, largely because of the tendency, discussed above,
to consider mistake as an aspect of contract formation. On the other hand,
frustration, which was formulated in terms of bringing the contract to an end,
appeared to be related to the idea of discharge of contractual obligations, and,
so it seemed, belonged at the other end of a treatise. Yet, from the perspective of
avoidance of unjust enrichment, as Palmer pointed out,70 the problems of justice
are identical whether the mistake is as to an existing fact or as to a future event.
McCamus also considers that “[c]ases of frustration are … quite similar to cases
of mistaken assumptions concerning the facts existing at the time an agreement
is entered into.”71 “Quite similar” may perhaps be understating the point, for it
is sometimes almost impossible to distinguish between the two kinds of mistake,
67. See Angela Swan, Canadian Contract Law, 2nd ed (Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2009).
Swan has said much of the law of misrepresentations is “needlessly complex” (ibid at 647).
68. Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis
Group) (Munich: Sellier, European Law Publishers, 2009) at art II – 7:201(1)(b).
69. Ibid 7:212.
70. Palmer, supra note 1 at 36. See also Swan, supra note 66 at 704. Swan says that “[t]he
problems of frustration are closely related to those of mistake: in each case the deal that the
parties made turns out to be a different deal from that which they (or at least one of them)
expected.”
71. McCamus, The Law of Contracts, supra note 35 at 600.
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as in the cases arising from the cancellation of the coronation processions for
Edward VII in 1902, where some contracts to rent seats or rooms had been
made before announcement of the cancellation, and others just afterwards (but
in ignorance of the announcement).72 Even the leading frustration case, Krell v
Henry,73 could plausibly be regarded as a mistake case, since, at the time of the
contract (and unknown to both parties), the King was probably suffering from a
physical condition called incipient appendicitis that was certain (had the medical
facts been fully known) to result in cancellation of the processions.
A conceptual amalgamation of the frustration and mistake cases would have
several far-reaching and, it is suggested, potentially beneficial consequences. It
would make recognition of relief for mistake easier to establish and accept, since
it is now recognized that relief for frustration is based on broad considerations
of justice (the implied-term explanation having been generally abandoned).74 It
is true that mistake is an older juridical concept than frustration, but, if they are
recognized as resting on the same principles, the following argument has force: If
relief is available (as it is) for mistake as to future facts (i.e., frustration), it must also
be available for mistake as to existing facts. Secondly, recognition of the decisive
importance of risk allocation to both mistake and frustration would benefit
the analysis of both topics. As McCamus says, “The relevance of risk-allocation
analysis is also supported by the analogy of the mistaken assumptions cases. …
The doctrines thus perform similar and related functions and it is appropriate,
therefore, that the analytical frameworks they employ would also be similar.”75
Thirdly, the treatment of reliance and of benefits conferred under the contract,
which have been much discussed in the context of frustration, could be carried
over to mistake cases, where the potential problems of restitution and reliance are
closely analogous, if not identical. Fourthly, the rigidities incidentally imposed
in respect of reliance and restitution by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts)
Act76 (the “Act”), which McCamus rightly calls “rather unsatisfactory,”77 could
be avoided in the context of mistake, and could in turn lead to a more flexible
approach to the same problems in the context of frustration in jurisdictions
that have not adopted the Act. Even in jurisdictions that have adopted the
Act, a more flexible approach applicable to both mistake and frustration might

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Griffith v Brymer (1903), 47 Sol Jo 493, 19 TLR 434.
[1903] 2 KB 740, [1900-03] All ER Rep 20.
See McCamus, The Law of Contracts, supra note 35 at 605-06.
Ibid at 618.
6 & 7 Geo VI c 40.
McCamus, The Law of Contracts, supra note 35 at 637.
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produce benefits in the shape of statutory interpretation on doubtful points and
on questions where the statute is not precisely applicable. It may also generate
suggestions for possible legislative reform. This issue is closely linked with the
general law of restitution, and is usefully discussed in McCamus’s treatise on
restitution78 as well as the general law on contracts.
Fifthly, viewing the question as one of avoidance of unjust enrichment
is conducive to flexibility in several respects by avoiding the all-or-nothing,
“on/off” concepts implicit in former and present approaches to both mistake
(contract valid or void) and frustration (contract valid or discharged). As was
mentioned above,79 the concept of a contract that is not necessarily void, but
that may be set aside by the judgment of the court for sufficient reason (i.e., one
that is voidable), admits of the possibility of enforcement by the mistaken party
if that party so chooses; it admits of the possibility of partial relief, or relief on
terms, which the court can fashion in order to meet the justice of the particular
case; and it admits of the possibility of denying or restricting relief in order to
protect third parties who may have relied on the validity of the contract. These
possibilities may be relevant in cases of frustration as well as in cases of mistake,
and are valuable tools of justice.
Overall, an examination of this subject demonstrates both the beneficial
power of good academic analysis in law, and the dangers of neglecting it. The
best academic writing, as exemplified by Palmer and McCamus, is capable of
clarifying thoughts on important theoretical questions while at the same time
assisting the courts in the practical administration and development of the law.

78. See Maddaugh & McCamus, supra note 52 at c 18.
79. See Part I, above.

